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PROPERTY*
F OR ALL they lacked in precedent-setting character, the 1967 Texas
property decisions were varied and sometimes quite novel. Moreover, a
few cases indicated important trends and provided some insight into sig-
nificant problems.
I. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Restrictive Covenants in Lease. While restrictive covenants are normally
found in deeds, their use in leases, work agreements, and other arrange-
ments is not uncommon. Neiman-Marcus v. Hexter' was a suit to deter-
mine the viability of restrictive covenants in a retail store sub-lease. In the
lease, executed to Neiman-Marcus by Hexter, the latter had covenanted
with Neiman's not to lease other premises in the shopping center for cer-
tain types of retail establishments, especially those which might compete
with the lessee. Neiman's assigned the lease to Nasher. Hexter brought suit
for a declaratory judgment, contending that the restrictions were personal
to Neiman's and could not be enforced by its assignee. The court found
that as owner of the leases both Neiman-Marcus and Nasher had the right
to enforce the restrictions contained therein.' In construing the restrictive
covenants contained in the sub-lease, the court looked to the intent of the
parties.' Since the lease to Neiman's defined "lessee" to include successors
and assigns, the court held that these restrictive covenants were not per-
sonal but ran with the land, and thus were enforceable by Neiman's,
Nasher, or any subsequent owner of the sub-lease.
Fixtures. In usual landlord-tenant relationships an improvement which is
firmly attached to the land with the intent that it be permanent is con-
sidered a "fixture" and becomes the landlord's property. At the end of the
lease it may not be removed. Trade fixtures, however, which are added by
the tenant to enable him to carry out the business contemplated by the
lease may be removed prior to the expiration of the lease or a reasonable
time thereafter. In Eubank v. Twin Mountain Oil Corp.' a lessee sought
to remove casings from oil wells still capable of production after the ex-
piration of the lease. Lessee contended that under prior decisions' the doc-
trine of trade fixtures applied, and that the casings were therefore re-
movable. Without discussing the fact that the lease terminated five years
prior to the attempted removal, or the aspect of trade fixtures, the court
held that, since the wells still could produce, the lessee had no right to
remove the casings and thus destroy the wells. He was, however, entitled
to compensation for their reasonable value.
A similar question was presented in Patton v. Rogers.6 Controlling here,
By the Board of Editors.
1412 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
'See Weinkrantz v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 264 S.W. 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
3 See Howeth v. Anderson, 25 Tex. 557 (1860).
4406 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'See generally cases cited in 25 TEX. JUR. 2d Fixtures § 26, at 423 n.15 (1961).
6417 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
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however, was a determination of the meaning of "production in paying
quantities." Holding that a possibility of production was sufficient to pro-
hibit removal of the casings, the court indicated that it would take a liberal
view of "production" in order to prevent the possible waste of natural
resources if the wells were destroyed. These decisions, following an estab-
lished trend, seem sound in light of this policy argument.
Significant changes regulating fixtures were promulgated by legislative
amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code during the year. These
changes are thoroughly examined by Professor Cosway's Article in the
Journal.7
Legislation. Two new articles dealing with landlord-tenant relations are
designed to prevent fraud in the creation of the relationship and to clarify
the question of terminating a periodical tenancy. Article 1553a of the
Penal Code8 (effective August 28, 1967) makes it a misdemeanor to obtain
occupancy of a house, duplex or apartment by fraud or deception, or
without the permission of the owner, or to give a worthless check for
rent, or to stop payment on a check for rent which is due and which is not
in controversy. This has conceivable relevance to the civil rights situation
in which a member of one race rents an apartment for a member of an-
other, although this would seem to be a peripheral effect. This article also
provides that a landlord may be guilty of a misdemeanor by granting oc-
cupancy by fraud or without permission of the tenant, or by giving a
worthless check for a refund or stopping payment on a check for a refund
which is due and is not in controversy.
Article 5236a' (effective August 28, 1967), also dealing with landlord-
tenant, provides that a tenancy from month to month may be terminated
by either the landlord or the tenant giving the other one month's notice.
If the intervals between the payments are less than a month, notice equal
to the interval between rental payments is sufficient to terminate the ten-
ancy. Tenancy need not be terminated on a day corresponding to the con-
clusion of the rent-paying period. This statute does not apply where a
different period of notice is specified by a written agreement or where
there is any breach of contract.
II. TITLE AND CONVEYANCE
Title. Several cases concerning title to property restated established rules
or presented further developments in previously reported cases."
Cosway, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 Sw. L.J. 713 (1967).
'TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1553a (Supp. 1967).
ITEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5236a (Supp. 1967).
"°See Veterans' Land Bd. v. Akers, 408 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.'r.e.
(where a deed contains a covenant of warranty, no recovery under the covenant can be had with-
out the showing of an eviction); Baker v. Smith, 407 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref.
n.r.e. (the court upheld the validity of a deed which lacked the words "for the purposes and con-
sideration therein expressed," usually found in acknowledgments to Texas deeds since execution
was proved and the parties to this suit were the identical parties to the instrument itself; Triplett
v. Shield, 406 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (when a general warranty cove-
nant and covenant against incumbrances is found in a deed, the grantor must discharge all liens
1968]
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Cooper v. Booker" involved a trespass to try title action between two
grantees from a common grantor. Cooper, the prior grantee, sued the sub-
sequent grantee, Booker, for title and possession to the disputed tract, bas-
ing his claim on his earlier general warranty deed. He failed to allege ten-
der or payment of the purchase money note. The prior general warranty
deed had reserved superior title and a vendor's lien to the vendor to secure
the purchase money note. In reversing the trial court, the court of civil ap-
peals stated that, since the prior vendee had defaulted in payment, the ven-
dor retained superior title and the right to rescind the sale. This right had
been exercised in the subsequent deed to Booker. The court held that in
order to exercise his claim to the property the prior vendee must prove that
superior title had passed to him. Therefore, the prior vendee could not sue
either the grantor or a subsequent grantee claiming under the grantor for
possession or title to the property as long as the purchase money note re-
mained unpaid.
Legislation. New article 9.08 of the revised insurance title provisions of
the Insurance Code" (effective October 1, 1967) enlarges the scope of
regulation of the sale of title insurance. This article prohibits insurance
companies from guaranteeing the payment of real estate mortgages and
prohibits "insuring around" (the willful issuance of a title policy showing
no enforceable recorded lien when the insurer knows of a recorded lien
against the property). The State Board of Insurance, however, can permit
"insuring around" under rules to be promulgated by it. This revision may
well affect the present practice employed when interim financing is used.
Much depends upon the Insurance Board's rules.
Innocent Purchaser. In Triangle Supply Co. v. Fletcher,3 a case involving
a working interest in an oil and gas lease, the assignee from the drilling
company owner sued to remove cloud from its title. The drilling company
had assigned its working interest in a 640-acre oil and gas lease to the plain-
tiff in 1963. This lease was then filed for record in the wrong county. This
error was subsequently discovered and a correct filing was made in 1965,
but meanwhile, in 1964, judgment creditors of the owner levied on all the
interest of the drilling company, including the oil and gas lease. The exe-
cution purchaser, having actual knowledge of the plaintiff's outstanding
interest, then sold 560 acres of this interest to a vendee who was without
and incumbrances, even those known to the grantee, which the grantee does not assume); Graham
v. Hubbard, 406 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (where two grantees claim under deeds from
the same grantor and the second grantee's deed is recorded first, the first grantee defeats the second
if the second (or his predecessor) knew of the first deed).
On recordation of a deed as evidence of an intent to deliver where no delivery can be shown
and the questionable use of negative evidence to rebut this presumption, see Williams v. Anderson,
414 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 870 (1967).
See also Bounds v. Taylor, 415 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (where
the court held that calls for quantities and courses and distances in a deed yield to calls for lines,
corners and objects fixed on the ground and which are capable of definite ascertainment); Socony
Mobil Oil Co. v. Frost, 407 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error granted (where the court
found that calls for adjoinder in a deed prevail over calls for distance).
11 406 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).55 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 9.08 (Supp. 1967).
'3 4 0 8 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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notice of the plaintiff's title. In upholding the vendee's title to the 560-
acre interest, the court applied the rule that "an innocent purchaser from
one who purchased with notice is as fully protected as if he had bought
without notice from the vendor of the party from whom he purchased."' 4
The court also rejected plaintiff's contention that open, exclusive, visible
and unequivocal possession of the remaining eighty acres of the original
tract would be sufficient to put the vendee on notice as to a claim concern-
ing the entire tract, since the only open acts of ownership had been con-
nected solely with the eighty-acre segment.
Royalties. In Clyde v. Hamilton5 the supreme court again considered the
question of whether a conveyance of "personal property" included un-
accrued royalties. Relying upon prior decisions the court affirmed the con-
cept that unaccrued royalties and the rights thereto are not personal prop-
erty but a return of corpus. Thus a right to a future royalty payment is an
interest in land."
Homestead. In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Ford7 the Eastland court of civil
appeals had occasion to examine the problem of two non-contiguous lots
claimed as part of a business homestead exemption. While finding that a
lot contiguous to the claimant's home and purchased for its protection
qualified for an exemption, the court refused to allow a business homestead
exemption for the two non-contiguous lots. The court required the claim-
ant to elect between the latter lots. The supreme court reversed and re-
manded, holding that if the two non-contiguous business lots were used
as a place for the operation of the business and were both essential to and
necessary for such business, the homestead exemption applied.
Legislation. Article 7401A " (effective August 28, 1967) now permits an
unsuccessful defendant in a trespass to try title suit to remove improve-
ments made by him on the land in controversy, if they were made without
the intent to defraud, provided he gives a surety bond and meets other
conditions of removal specified by the Act.
III. ADVERSE POSSESSrON
The concept of adverse possession requires an open claim which is ad-
verse in content to the claim of ownership of the record owner. Where
cotenants hold property it is the rule that, each having the right to use the
property, such use cannot normally be "adverse" to the right of the other.
In a matter which has been before the courts in various forms for twenty
years, the Houston court of civil appeals decided that acquiescence in
claims of ownership for some fifty years led to a clear presumption of an
"See Holmes v. Buckner, 67 Tex. 107, 2 S.W. 452 (1886).
'5414 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1967).
16Cf. Haile v. Holtzclaw, 414 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1967).
17 417 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
'STEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7401A (Supp. 1967).
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unrecorded deed1" conveying the interest of one cotenant to the other.
Sweeny and Page were cotenants of record. For some fifty years Page
apparently knew of and failed to protest Sweeny's claims of sole owner-
ship. Since they were cotenants, it was argued, Sweeny's use of the land
could not be "adverse" so no right accrued through the doctrine of ad-
verse possession. The court of civil appeals affirmed a judgment for Swee-
ny's assigns, stating that the presumption of an unrecorded conveyance
from Page to Sweeny permitted summary judgment for those claiming
through the latter.
IV. WATER RIGHTS
In the continuation of a set of proceedings characterized by the Texas
Supreme Court as one of "great magnitude, 20 the court of civil appeals at
Corpus Christi was petitioned to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the
ninety-third district court of Hidalgo County to enter a "final judgment"
in the continuing Valley Water Case.2' The district court had entered a
judgment purporting to authorize itself to "enlarge or abrogate or modify
from time to time any portion or feature of the decree." 2 While most of
the decision deals with judgments in general under Texas law, the court
was obliged to consider the standing of this "open-end" judgment dealing
with rights to the use of water. The court reviewed similar open-end judg-
ments rendered in other jurisdictions and found that, in all cases where
such judgments have been used, authority for such action was based on a
statute, or, as in California," upon the declared public policy in water
rights cases (that water be put to its fullest beneficial use) found in a self-
enacting amendment to the state constitution. The court stated that the
Texas constitutional conservation amendment' was not self-executing and
that the only relevant statutory authority" limited retention of jurisdiction
to the period of time pending appeal. In denying the application for man-
damus, the court stated that the trial court's judgment had not transcended
the statutory limitation.
In City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission" the supreme court
was called on to settle a dispute over the use of waters in multiple water-
sheds. The supreme court found that sufficient evidence sustained rulings
by the Texas Water Commission to the effect that the Guadalupe-Blanco
River Authority had the right to appropriate water from the Canyon Dam
Reservoir in Comal County while denying a similar right to San Antonio
to draw water from the same source for like purposes. The Commission had
discretion and the evidence adduced was sufficient to indicate that discre-
"Page v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 412 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
For earlier background, see Bernard River Land Dev. Co. v. Sweeny, 216 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
20Hidalgo & Cameron Counties Water Control v. Starley, 373 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1964).
21 State v. Starley, 413 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 865 (1967).
21Id. at 453.
'CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207
P.2d 17 (1949).
I'TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7589b (1957, as amended 1965).
26407 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1966).
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tion had not been abused. The court thus supported the Commission in its
efforts to carry out a broad, comprehensive regulation of the use of waters
from rivers, streams and lakes.
V. EASEMENTS AND DEDICATIONS
Easements.27 Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co."s considered the nature of
an additional line right clause contained in a pipe line easement. The ease-
ment was granted in 1937 by plaintiff to defendant's assignor and author-
ized the laying of pipe line within a fifty-foot right-of-way. Additional
lines could be laid at any later time upon the payment of an additional fee.
In 1966, defendant sought to lay an additional pipe line and tendered pay-
ment therefor, which was refused by plaintiff. After defendant commenced
construction, plaintiff brought a suit for damage to his land alleging in-
validity of the additional line clause. Plaintiff contended that the clause
was merely the grant of an option and as such was lost because it had not
been exercised within a reasonable time. He further contended that, since
the asserted option was unlimited in time, it was in violation of the Rule
Against Perpetuities and therefore void. In affirming the summary judg-
ment granted defendant, the court of civil appeals held that the questioned
clause did not convey a mere option; the right was an expansible easement
which presently vested in the grantee an interest in land and as such was
not barred by delay in exercise. In defining this interest in land, the court
adopted the Restatement of Property" explanation: "The 'expansible as-
pect' of some such interests can be thought of as the progressive utilization,
in its entirety, of an interest fully created at the beginning, or as the cre-
ation of an original less inclusive interest to which new rights are added
from time to time.
'30
Dedication. When a purchaser buys property with knowledge of dedi-
cated streets, he is entitled to rely on the dedication and entitled to the
benefit thereof. These rights of the purchaser are private contract rights
which are not affected by the failure of a city to take any affirmative action
to open such streets. The purchaser has a right to use the easement in the
reasonable enjoyment of his property and usually may make such improve-
ments to insure such enjoyment. In Dykes v. City of Houston3' the su-
preme court had to balance the landowner's right to an easement-of-way
over land dedicated for use as a street against the municipality's use of its
police power to block off unimproved streets to protect the public from
danger. Plaintiffs had purchased their lots from a vendor who exhibited a
map showing an abutting unopened street. When the city failed to open
"VSee Teich v. Haby, 408 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e. (in order to
establish an easement by implied grant a need for reasonable necessity must be shown); Colborn
v. Bailey, 408 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (an easement for "driveway purposes" gives
rights of ingress and egress but not of parking a car on the grantor's property).
28417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 399, comment g (1944).
30 Id.
as406 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1966).
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the street, one of the plaintiff's sought to bulldoze it open. The city erected
a permanent barrier to prevent autos from entering the then semi-
improved street, stating that it was unsafe and dangerous to vehicles. After
unsuccessful attempts to remove the barrier by force, the landowner sued
for an injunction to force removal by the city. The court stated that when
a vendee purchases a lot, relying on the exhibition of a map on which a
street is described, and the street is not yet open, this operates as an im-
mediate dedication, and the purchaser acquires a private easement, whether
or not the street is ever opened by the city. Such rights are, of course, sub-
ject to the valid police powers of the city. The court held that, while the
city might well have the right to erect signs and barriers to warn the pub-
lic of possible injury, it could not prevent the reasonable use of the street
by the plaintiffs and thus destroy their easement.
In Peterson v. Greenway Parks Home Owners' Ass'n" a substantial
amount of choice land in a subdivision had been dedicated for use as a
park. The Association claimed that the land could not be used practicably
as a park and sought cancellation of the restriction in use and the right to
dispose of the property. The court found no great changes in the neigh-
borhood and refused to permit the sale. It held, as one might expect,' that
the mere fact that the land might be more valuable when used in another
way was not sufficient to permit a court to approve a change in a restric-
tion of this sort. The court stated that to obtain a change in restriction
based on changed condition, it must be shown that the neighborhood has
so changed that it was truly unsuitable or inadequate for the restricted
purpose.
VI. LAND UTILIZATION: COVENANTS, ZONING
Creation of a servitude running with the land requires either the express
joint intent of the grantor and grantee to impose a restriction on the
grantee's land for the benefit of the grantor's retained land or knowledge
by the grantee at the time of purchase that a general plan or scheme en-
compassing the tracts exists. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Pine Forest Coun-
try Club' the grantor placed restrictions in a deed to the vendee country
club limiting the vendee's use of the purchased premises. The grantor re-
tained land in the area but the deed to the club did not state that the
restrictions were imposed for the benefit of the retained land nor was any
overall plat ever filed. Grantor later conveyed the retained rights to the
country club and conveyed the retained land to the defendant. The club
sued to remove the cloud on its title, contending that the original restric-
tions were personal to the grantor and were subsequently extinguished by
the conveyance of these rights to the club. In affirming the trial court's
judgment n.o.v. for the club, the court of civil appeals stated that the
covenant was personal to the grantor. There was no evidence to indicate
3"408 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
'See City of Fort Worth v. Burnett, 131 Tex. 190, 114 S.W.2d 220 (1938).
34409 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error *ref. n.r.e.
[Vol. 22
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either a general plan or scheme encompassing the retained land or to show
an intent by the covenantee to subject his land to the restrictions for the
benefit of the retained land.
Two cases considered the rule of construing covenants strictly in favor
of the free use of land. Both found the restrictions not binding. In Kent v.
Smith' defendant had placed an outbuilding on his lot with the approval
of a planning committee as required by deed restriction. The court re-
jected a contention by plaintiffs that a clause in the deed restrictions lim-
iting use to "single family dwelling" prohibited the erection of more than
one building. In Lochwood Meadows, Inc. v. Buck: a deed restriction pro-
hibited a "fence." Plaintiff brought suit for an injunction to require de-
fendant to remove a wooden fence and a ligustrum hedge which ran paral-
lel to the wooden fence, asserting both were in violation of the restriction.
The trial court granted the injunction requiring removal of the wooden
fence but refused to order removal of the hedge. Plaintiff appealed, claim-
ing the hedge was included within the definition of fence and relied on a
dictionary definition of fence as applied by a criminal case in 1902."7 The
court rejected plaintiff's contention, stating that the instant hedge did not
form a "complete enclosure" since gaps existed between the plants suffici-
ent to permit the entry or escape of cattle. One wonders if the hedge will
mature into a fence.
Zoning: Procedure. Pursuant to the Zoning Enabling Act, " the legislative
body of a municipality may provide for the manner in which zoning reg-
ulations and restrictions are to be adopted, amended, or supplemented.
Section (d) of the Act requires the municipality to "provide for the man-
ner in which such regulations and restrictions ... shall be determined....""
Under this Act, the city of Tyler enacted a city zoning ordinance. Part
of this ordinance established a City Plan Commission and required that a
"plan for use and development" be submitted to this planning commission
and be approved by it in a final report prior to action by the City
Commission. In Wallace v. Daniel' landowners in Tyler, whose property
adjoined rezoned property, brought suit for a declaratory judgment that
the rezoning ordinance was void. A proposed change had been submitted
to the City Plan Commission and a public hearing held thereon, but, since
a plan for the use and development had not been properly filed by the ap-
plicant, the City Plan Commission gave only a qualified approval to the
proposal. Thereafter, the City Commission held a hearing and adopted the
proposed change. In reversing for the plaintiffs, the court of civil appeals
held the ordinance void since the procedural requirements set out in the
basic zoning ordinance had not been followed. The court stated that the
city must follow the procedure it adopts. The court did not discuss or dis-
3410 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
3"416 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
" Burch v. State, 67 S W. 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1902).
STEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 1011a (1964).
"Id. art. lo1d.
40409 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
1968]
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tinguish an earlier case" which held that, since a city council can adopt
or reject any recommendation of a planning commission, a failure to follow
zoning ordinance procedure (as in the principal case) will not invalidate
changes adopted by the city council.
VII. EMINENT DOMAIN
A large number of cases considered problems involved in eminent
domain proceedings, especially in the realm of compensation.' In Haley
v. State"a the Beaumont court of civil appeals passed on the right of the
state, as condemnor, to have the market value of the land condemned re-
duced by the amount which the value had been enhanced three years
earlier when a railroad had abandoned a right of way easement over a por-
tion of the land. The court recognized the general rule that a condemnor is
not obligated to pay for an enhancement in value of the property occurring
as a result of a public improvement made before the date of the taking"
but found that the instant enhancement in value was not related to the
proposed taking and that the condemnees were thereby constitutionally en-
titled to the full market value of the property as of the date taken.
In Renault, Inc. v. City of Houston's the court was faced with the prob-
lem of damage to personal property in an amount close to $1 million.
Renault stored automobiles on premises next to a road which was main-
tained by the city. The lay of the road caused rainwater to be impounded
on Renault's leased acreage and many of its automobiles were damaged.
Renault's suit against the city alleged strict liability based on a violation
of article 7589a"6 and, also, a "taking" within the constitutional definition
as the basis of liability. The court held that the city was not strictly liable
for impounding the waters since the instant statute applied only to a diver-
sion of water by a "person, firm or private corporation," not to acts by a
public corporation. Nevertheless, since Renault's property was damaged as
the result of the maintenance of the road, a "public use," the court held
that compensation was due under the terms of the Texas Constitution,
article I, section 17. The court rejected the city's argument that, if the
constitutional requirement of payment of compensation applies to private
property subjected to a "perpetual servitude,"" no payment would be owed
41 Clesi v. Northwest Dallas Improvement Ass'n, 263 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error
ref. n.r.e.
42See generally on this subject, State v. Hilton, 412 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1967) (the state has
a right to examine a condemnee's witness who had served as a commissioner in a case where the
special commission's award and this witness' trial testimony differed); Urban Renewal Agency v.
Trammel, 407 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1966) (where a lease and reversion are at issue, the value of
each must be found; a single jury finding of the value of the entire premises is not sufficient);
Crouch v. State, 413 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (trial court has broad discretion in de-
termining whether sales offered in evidence are of comparable properties); Naumann v. Urban
Renewal Agency, 411 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. nr.e. (the loss of income
sustained by reason of a loss in rentals or reduction in rental income due to an impending con-
demnation cannot be recovered).
43406 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
" See City of Dallas v. Shackleford, 145 Tex. 528, 199 S.W.2d 503 (1947).
45415 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
4 See Tnx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7589a (1964).




in the instant case since there would obviously be no perpetual servitude
present. The court also rejected the city's argument that the damage re-
sulted solely from a maintenance of the street, a proprietary function, and
that the doctrine of governmental immunity prevented a recovery by the
plaintiff. Writ of error has been granted in this case.
In State v. Fuller48 the Texas Supreme Court examined an easement and
right of access problem. The action was instituted by the state to determine
the surface ownership of a segment of an abandoned railroad right of way.
The right of way abutted U.S. Highway 69, which had been deeded to the
state in fee, on one side and the land of Fuller on the other side of the
right of way. The court applied the well-settled rule that a deed to land
abutting a railroad right of way conveys title to the center of the right of
way unless the contrary intention is expressed in the deed. 9 Thus the state
and Fuller would own the surface rights of the abandoned right of way
equally. Fuller contended that the problem came under an exception to
this rule created in Haines v. McLean." The court found that the Haines
rule was not applicable since in that case the state did not have fee simple
title in the abutting land, only a determinable fee, thus the state did not
have title to the center of the right of way. In discussing Fuller's right of
access to Highway 69, the court held that no such right existed since his
property did not adjoin the highway (the state owning one-half of the
abandoned right of way nearest the highway). Fuller's right to access can
not materialize until the state expands the highway to abutt Fuller's land.
VIII. PUBLIC LANDS
Mines and Minerals. In Duval Corp. v. Sadler1 the supreme court, in
considering statutes dealing with minerals and prospecting on public lands,
held that articles 5388-5403". of the Mineral Act of July 31, 1919 were
not repealed by article 5421c," as amended in 1939, and hence that the
Land Commissioner, in a proper case, could be ordered to issue mineral
awards to one who has done all that the prior statutes required. Plaintiff
made a sulphur development application to the Commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office of Texas. His application involved public free school lands
which had been sold by the state with a reservation of mineral rights. The
Commissioner rejected all the applications on the basis that the minerals
could only be acquired under article 5421c, apparently believing that the
reserved minerals constituted unsold public free school lands. The court
rejected the Commissioner's view and held that articles 5388-5403 had not
been repealed. 4
Legislation: School Land Leases. Article 5421c-10"5 (effective March 15,
48407 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. 1966).
4 Cox v. Campbell, 135 Tex. 428, 143 S.W.2d 361 (1940).
50154 Tex. 272, 276 S.W.2d 777 (1955).
51407 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1966).5 2
TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5388-5403 (1964).
sId. art. 5421c.




1967) now makes the owner of the soil the agent of the state for the pur-
pose of leasing coal, lignite, sulphur and potash on land sold by, and with
all minerals reserved to, the state. Lessees are required to pay sixty per cent
of all bonuses, rentals, and royalties to the state, and forty per cent to the
owner. With production, the state receives not less than one-sixteenth of
the value of the minerals produced. Oil and gas, and the Relinquishment
Act," are expressly excluded from the operation of this article.
IX. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
Liens.' Article 5469 requires an owner who enters a construction con-
tract to withhold a retainage of ten per cent of the contract price for thirty
days after completion in order to ratably guarantee the claims of mechan-
ics and materialmen." In Hunt Developers, Inc. v. Western Steel Com-
pany"' a court of civil appeals comprehensively examined the method by
which a materialman can perfect a lien against property when the owner
has paid the full contract price to the contractor in violation of article
5469. In Hunt, at the time of payment by the owner, there was an out-
standing indebtedness owed to a materialman. The materialman gave notice
of this debt to the owner within thirty days of completion of the contract,
as required by statute. The owner contended that since the materialman did
not follow the article 5453 (3)60 requirements for notice, itemization, and
warning of personal liability, he had not perfected his lien under article
5469. The court held that the requirements of article 5453 are fulfilled
when notice is given sufficient to appraise the owner that a materialman
remains unpaid, at least as long as no one is mislead to his detriment. Since
the warning was sufficient, the owner was held liable to the materialman
for an amount up to ten per cent of the contract price. The court also
pointed out that the statutory ten per cent retainage requirement means
ten per cent of the entire contract price, not ten per cent of the subcontract
to the materialman.
Article 5460,"1 the exclusive procedure for establishing a lien on a home-
stead, requires a properly acknowledged and recorded contract for im-
provements executed by the owner. A materialman may establish a lien if
he has contracted directly with the owner. If the materialman has not con-
tracted directly with the owner, but a contract exists between the owner
and a contractor, this contract inures to the benefit of the materialman,
"TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5367 (1962).
" See Rhoades v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (a constitutional lien for
labor done or materials furnished does not include attorney's fees; the reasonableness of attorney's
fees is a question of fact to be determined by the court or jury as any other fact issue and as
such is required to be supported by competent evidence); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Palmer,
412 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e. (statutory warning of potential liability
of an owner which must be given as a condition precedent to the owner's authority to withhold
funds from a contractor and hence to the creation of a lien are not fulfilled by the mailing of
copies of billing statements to the owner by the subcontractor; also, the subcontractor could not
recover on surety bond since he failed to give proper notice to the surety and the original con-
tractor).
"TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1967).
"409 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
"°TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5453(3) (Supp. 1967).
1 Id. art. 5460 (1964); see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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giving him a lien for the materials he furnishes. In W & W Floor Covering
Co. v. Project Acceptance Co.,"2 a case of first impression in Texas, a ques-
tion arose concerning the priority of a materialman's lien and a lien of a
holder in due course of a negotiable note secured by a contractual lien
against a homestead. The contract was in the form of a mechanic's and
materialman's lien and was properly executed and acknowledged before
any work began. To secure payment, a negotiable promissory note was ex-
ecuted to the contractor on the same date as the lien contract and was duly
recorded. Before construction began, the note was assigned to Project Ac-
ceptance Company. The contractor undertook construction and at his re-
quest the flooring company furnished materials. The contractor abandoned
the construction and Project Acceptance completed the home. Plaintiff
floor company was not paid and thereupon gave proper notice and filed
its lien. It then instituted suit against the owner, the contractor, and the
noteholder to foreclose its lien on the homestead and to establish that its
lien was superior to that of the noteholder. The court stated that since a
materialman's lien is derivative and is based on funds in the hands of the
owner which are owed to a contractor, the instant assignment of the note
and lien to a third party by the contractor cut off the materialman's lien,
since there were no funds owed to the contractor in the hands of the owner
after the assignment, and therefore the materialman's lien could not attach
to the land. "
Appellant also contended that a lien had attached to the property since
the owner had failed to retain ten per cent of the contract price in viola-
tion of article 5469." The court found that a lien would have attached ex-
cept for the fact that Project Acceptance was a holder in due course of the
note and lien and thus entitled to priority in the enforcement of its lien.
But, since the owner violated article 5469, a personal judgment for the
amount owed to the appellant was granted, the amount being within the
ten per cent of the contract price. The result of this holding would seem to
be a warning to the owner who is having improvements made on his land:
if he gives a negotiable note in payment for the improvements, the note
should not be for more than ninety per cent of the contract price; then
if a materialman has not been paid, and if the note has been assigned, the
owner will only be liable for the ten per cent retainage. If the owner fol-
lows this procedure there will be no possibility of liability in excess of the
contract price. The remedy left open to the subcontractor seems at best
to be extremely shallow. In giving priority to the holder in due course, the
court left the materialman only a personal judgment which more than
likely could not be enforced where the owner and contractor have already
defaulted. It would seem that the courts should do more than give a per-
sonal judgment to protect the subcontractor when a note is assigned. If
the owner had paid cash to the contractor, the subcontractor would have
had a lien under article 5469 for the statutory retainage of ten per cent
12412 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
3 See McCutcheon v. Union Mercantile Co., 267 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
4TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (Supp. 1967).
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of the contract price. This lien is based upon the fact that the owner is
required to hold certain funds in his hands for the thirty-day period. It
does not logically follow that the owner should be able to relieve himself
of the duty of retainage simply by executing a note and lien instead of
paying in cash.
Priorities. The constantly recurring problem of the relation back doctrine
of Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffith"5 arose in several cases during the past year.
The doctrine basically states that when there is a general construction con-
tract between an owner and a contractor for the construction of a pro-
jected building, all the liens resulting from the construction are on a gen-
eral parity and have their inception on the date the general contract was
executed or work was begun. Thus, these liens have priority over any deed
of trust subsequently executed by the owner. This doctrine was applied in
Security Lumber Co. v. Weighard Construction Co."a Weighard Company,
a speculative builder, owned three lots in Houston and entered into an
oral agreement with Security to furnish materials for three houses under
construction on the lots. Material was delivered to the construction sites
before and after the owner had obtained a construction loan, secured by a
deed of trust, from University Savings & Loan. Following Weighard's
default in payment, Security brought suit, joining University Savings as
defendant. University Savings asserted that its deed of trust lien had prior-
ity over the lien for material furnished subsequent to the execution of the
deed of trust since each delivery of material by Security constituted a sep-
arate contract. The trial court, agreeing with University Savings, held that
Security's liens had priority only for the materials delivered prior to the
execution of the deed of trust. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding
that the deliveries of material were not separate contracts; they related
back to the original material contract. Thus, Security's lien for the entire
contract price was prior to that of the deed of trust lien of University
Savings. The court reasoned that to hold that each delivery was a separate
contact would place a harsh burden upon a supplier to check the lien rec-
ords before each delivery, regardless of the particular arrangement with the
contractor. Such a result, the court found, would be against the legislative
intent. The supreme court has subsequently affirmed the court of civil
appeals holding on this issue."
Another question involving application of the Oriental doctrine arose in
Finger Furniture Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank-." A general contract was
executed between a property owner, F.B. & D., Inc., and a general con-
tractor for the construction of an apartment building. The contractor was
also the president and general manager of F.B. & D. Subsequent to the exe-
cution of the contract F.B. & D. entered into a building loan agreement
65 86 Tex. 574, 33 S.W. 652 (1895). See also McConnel v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572,
305 S.W.2d 280 (1957); Sullivan v. Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 94 Tex. 541, 63 S.W. 307
(1901).
66413 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
6711 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 105 (1968).
6413 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error granted.
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with Chase Manhattan, secured by a deed of trust which was recorded
at that time. The suit arose as a contest of priorities between Chase Man-
hattan and two materialmen. One materialman's lien arose from work and
material furnished before the deed of trust was executed; the other lien
arose after execution. Although the work was expressly contemplated by
the general contract and the contractor was obligated to furnish the ma-
terials, the material was furnished to the owner, individually, at his re-
quest. The court applied the relation back doctrine of Oriental in holding
that the liens had their inception at the date of the general contract. The
decision was based upon the fact that the work and material furnished was
contemplated by the general contract. Oriental was relied upon since some
of the materialmen in that case dealt directly with the owner rather than
the general contractor.
The court in Finger seems to ignore cases following Oriental which limit
recovery to work arising out of the general contract."9 The instant exten-
sion of the relation back doctrine may be justified since the owner and
the general contractor were essentially the same party and the contract
stated that all materials were to be furnished by the contractor. But, this
decision may allow the creation of liens superior to the deed of trust lien,
even though not contemplated by the general contract. The court is pos-
sibly adopting a slanted view of Oriental in allowing recovery for material-
men who deal with the owner, especially those who furnish material after
the execution of the deed of trust.
The question of priority between the holder of a mechanic's lien and the
holder of a garnishment judgment was raised in Win. J. Burns Interna-
tional Detective Agency, Inc. v. General Electric Supply Co.7" Burns ob-
tained a valid judgment against the owner of certain property and pro-
ceeded to garnish the owner's funds held by Stewart Title Company.
General Electric, the assignee of a materialman's lien against the owner's
property, also served a writ of garnishment against Stewart Title. The
court of civil appeals held that in order for a valid mechanic's and ma-
terialman's lien to take priority over funds previously garnished by a
creditor, it must be shown that the lien was validly perfected prior to the
garnishment; otherwise the garnishment prior in time has the prior right.
Legislation. In an attempt to curb the practice by some contractors and
subcontractors of absconding with funds paid them on contracts before
paying mechanics and materialmen, the legislature enacted article
5472 (e).71 This article, effective August 28, 1967, provides that all moneys
paid to a contractor or subcontractor under a construction contract for the
improvement of real property, above a reasonable amount for overhead, are
declared to be trust funds for the mechanics and materialmen working on
gSee McConnel v. Mortgage Inv. Co., 157 Tex. 572, 305 S.W.2d 280 (1957); Sullivan v.
Texas Briquette & Coal Co., 94 Tex. 541, 63 S.W. 307 (1901); Newman v. Coker, 310 S.W.2d
354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); cf. Regold Mfg. Co. v. Maccabees, 348 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961) error ref. n.r.e.
70413 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
71 TFx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472(e) (Supp. 1967).
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the property. The contractor or subcontractor is made trustee of the fund
and punishment by fine or imprisonment is imposed for misapplication of
the trust funds. Moneys received under a construction contract are exempt
if the full contract amount is covered by a corporate surety payment bond.
X. PERSONAL PROPERTY
Conditional Sale of Vehicles. In Alexander v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc."1
the court of civil appeals at Texarkana considered the effect of the chattel
mortgage registration laws and the Texas Certificate of Title Act"3 on the
sale of a house trailer under a conditional sales contract. A Texas manu-
facturer of a house trailer sold and delivered the trailer to a dealer in
Georgia pursuant to a conditional sales contract. The bill of sale and the
manufacturer's statement of origin of a motor vehicle (the "manufac-
turer's certificate") were intentionally not delivered, being retained until
full payment was received. The dealer sold the trailer to Smith, and Smith
sold it in Louisiana to Alexander, who had no actual notice of the interest
of the original vendor. Alexander urged that the law applicable to the last
sale was that of Georgia or Louisiana and that under either he was a bona
fide purchaser without notice and took free of any claim by the manufac-
turer. The court, however, applied Texas law and found that Alexander
was not protected as an innocent purchaser for value. The court stated
that "the lien of a lender having exclusive physical possession of a certifi-
cate of title is superior to the equities of subsequent purchasers or lien
holders, although the lien is not noted on the certificate as directed in the
Certificate of Title Act, when the subsequent sale transaction is not influ-
enced by the omission of the lien notation from the certificate."74 The court
found no prejudice here. Justice Davis, dissenting, urged that the law of
Georgia was applicable; that the sale was made without notice of any lien,
that seller was negligent in handling its claim; and that to make Alexander
in effect pay twice would be "degrading.""
Loss of Property by Common Carrier. Interstate carriers are permitted
under the Motor Vehicle Act" to limit their liability for loss of a passen-
ger's baggage which has been carried free with one paying fare by filing
with the Interstate Commerce Commission and publishing a tariff." In
Greyhound Corp. v. Stevens" plaintiff sought damages for the loss of two
bags which had been entrusted to defendant during plaintiff's trip from
Texas to Delaware. Plaintiff asserted that the limitation of liability printed
on her bus ticket and the posted notices to that effect in the Texas bus
terminal had not been called to her attention and consequently she had not
been given a fair opportunity to elect to pay a higher fare to insure her
72406 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
7 3 TEX. PEN. COE ANN. art. 1436-1, S 1 (1964).
74 406 S.W.2d at 923.
" Id. at 927.
7649 U.S.C. S 319 (1964).
77 Id. § 20(11).
78413 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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baggage. The court of civil appeals reversed the trial court's award of $ 500
and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of the tariff ($25).
The court of civil appeals restated the rule" that posting of notices or
printing of the limitation of liability on the tickets is sufficient to offer an
interstate passenger a fair opportunity to choose between a higher or lower
liability for loss, and the passenger need not be actually informed that a
choice of rates is available.
XI. OTHER PROBLEMS
Married Women's Property. There have to date been only a limited num-
ber of cases construing the 1963 legislation" relative to married women's
rights. In Diamond v. Borensteins5 the court of civil appeals at El Paso had
before it a deed of trust covering a married woman's separate realty. The
acknowledgment was clearly defective under existing Texas law in that
the disqualification of the notary taking it was apparent on its face, he
being one of the beneficiaries. The court, in view of the repeal of article
1299 and other recent legislation, held that narrow, technical require-
ments would no longer serve to frustrate the intent of a married woman
as to a deed of trust executed after the legislation, as was the case here, and
the deed was valid. This court thus followed the lead of Kitten v. Vaughn.s5
On appeal, the decision was affirmed, per curiam, by the Texas Supreme
Court. 3 However, the court pointed out that articles 6605 and 6608,84
dealing with the manner and form of a married woman's acknowledgment,
had not, at that time, been repealed but that the trust deed was not void
as between the parties. Those sections have been repealed, effective January
1, 1968."
Taxation of Property. In a case which may be before the courts for some
time, Clark G. Thompson sought to require the city of Houston and others
to include personal property on the tax rolls through the technique of en-
joining the collection of the real estate taxes assessed in the area."8 Armed
with substantial evidence that personal property was largely untaxed and
the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in City of Arlington v. Cannon,7
which dealt with equality and uniformity of taxation, Thompson claimed
that his real property taxes would be substantially reduced if his demands
were met. The court nevertheless found that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in refusing an injunction since the taxpayer was not entitled
to relief unless he could show substantial injury and, on the record, he
failed to do so in that he failed to show that he owned, subject to taxation,
" Boston & M.R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1913).
80 See, e.g., TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1299, 1300, 4614, 4618, 4621, 4623, 4624, 4626,
6605, 6608 (1963).
81410 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.wr.e., per curiam, 414 S.W.2d 454
(1967).
82 397 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
83414 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1967).
"TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6605, 6608 (repealed 1967).
85 Tex. Laws 1967, ch. 309, § 7, at 714.
"
8 Thompson v. City of Houston, 410 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) error ref. n.r.e.
" 153 Tex. 566, 271 S.W.2d 414 (1954).
1968 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
substantially more real than personal property."8 No doubt in time such
showings will be made in these or similar cases and an apparently widely
followed practice will have to be considered on the merits.
Legislation. Article 7172" (effective August 28, 1967), dealing with tax
liens on mineral estates, has been amended with respect to severed mineral
estates. For such estates, the statute provides that the lien for ad valorem
taxes will expire when the mineral estate terminates, and is not thereafter
enforceable against (1) any part of the surface estate not owned by the
owner of the encumbered mineral interest, (2) any other part of the same
mineral interest under a different ownership, (3) personally against the
surface owner unless he also owns the encumbered mineral interest, or (4)
against any personalty not owned by the owner of the encumbered min-
eral interest. The former mineral interest owner remains personally liable
for the taxes assessed on his interest.
Brokers."0 In Texas, as elsewhere, limitations are placed on the activities
of brokers who are licensed only in other states but wish to do business
here. Section 7(b) of the Real Estate License Act 1 permits a non-resident
broker or salesman to engage in transactions in Texas if he associates him-
self with a Texas licensee who actually conducts the transaction. In White
v. Cooper,92 a suit for a real estate commission by an out-of-state broker,
the defense was advanced that only a duly licensed broker could maintain
such an action in Texas. The court stated that association with a Texas
broker who actually conducted the sale was all that could be required of an
out-of-state broker. It was a question of fact as to who conducted the sale
and the court remanded the case for a finding on this issue.
Legislation. Article 6573a" (effective August 28, 1967) was changed
by the Sixtieth Legislature to tighten the educational and experience re-
quirements prerequisite to receiving real estate brokers' and salesmen's li-
censes.
Nuisance. In Ellen v. City of Bryan"' the right to maintain a chicken
farm was challenged by the city in an action to abate a nuisance. While
the instant odoriferous condition was found to be temporary, the nuisance
was also found to be a recurring one. The court of civil appeals conse-
quently had little trouble in sustaining an injunction whether or not
there was a remedy available at law.
"8 For a similar suit in which the taxpayer had difficulty convincing the court that he was
being discriminated against, see Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 406 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
" TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7172 (Supp. 1967).
" On a time limit clause in a commission contract for procuring a lease, see Shamaley v. Say-
klay, 406 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); on the strict rule requiring that a commission con-
tract be in writing before a commission can be claimed, see Randolph v. Cary, 406 S.W.2d 551
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.; on distinguishing a broker from a joint venturer, see
Ames v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 411 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (1964).
9'415 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
aTrx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (Supp. 1967).
94410 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error ref. n.r.e.
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